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49-3-103(7)

Utah Code Annotated

49-3-103(2)

Utah Code Annotated

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The whole case centers around the meaning of 49-3-103(7)
of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

Petitioner submits that

since he received a promotion, which by its very nature required
substantial overtime, there is no restriction on the overtime
consideration in determining the Final Average Salary of the
Petitioner for retirement purposes.

This was the sole issue before

the Utah State Retirement Board, and therefore the entire record
before the Board was focused on this central issue.

This is clearly

and question of law, as the Board is given no deference regarding
the same, and the issue is reviewed under a correction-of-error
standard.

Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 585; Utah Dept. of Admin.

Services, 658 P.2d at 608; Superior Soft Water, 843 P.2d at 528,
Dept. of Transportation vs. Personnel Review Board, 798 P.2d 761,
(Utah App. 1990).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 49-3-103(2) provides as follows:
(2) (a) "Compensation," "salary,Mf or "wages" means the
total amount of payments made by an

employer to an employee

for services rendered to the employer, including:
(i) Bonuses;
(ii) cost-of-living adjustment;
(iii) payment currently includable in gross
income and that are subject to Social Security deductions,
including any payments in excess of the maximum amount
subject to deduction under Social Security law; and
(iv) amounts that the employee authorizes to be
deducted or reduced for salary deferral or other benefit
programs authorized by federal law.
(b) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal Revenue Code Section
401(a)(17).
(c) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" does not
include:
(i) the monetary value of remuneration paid in
kind, such as a residence or use of equipment;
(ii) all contributions made by an employer
under any plan for the benefit of a participant;
(iii) salary paid to an employee working under
the minimum number of hours required for membership;
(iv) salary paid to a temporary or exempt

employee;
(v) any payments upon termination, including
accumulated lump-sum vacation, sick leave payments,
or any other special payments; or
(vi) uniform, travel, or similar allowances.
Utah Code Annotated 49-3-103(7) provides as follows:
(7) "Final average salary11 means the amount computed
by averaging the

highest three years of annual compensation

preceding retirement subject to Subsections (a), (b) and (c).
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the
percentage increase in annual compensation in any one of the
years used may not exceed the previous year's salary by more
than 10% plus a cost-of-living adjustment equal to the decrease
in the purchasing power of the dollar during the previous year,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index prepared by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides
acceptable documentation to the board, the limitation in
subsection (a) may be exceeded if:
(i) the member has transferred from another
employing unit;
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new
position; or
(iii) the years used are not consecutive.
(c) For purposes of computing the member's final
average salary only, the member is considered to have been in

service at his last salary rate from the date of the termination
of employment to the date retirement becomes effective if the
member so requests.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Utah State Retirement Board,
involving the issue of overtime in determining "Final Average
Salary.1' The Board placed a 13% limitation on overtime pay,
and Appellant sumbits that that is an error, as a matter of law.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal involves the interpretation of the law, and
has no questions of fact at issue.

The sole issue is whether

the Petitioner's Overtime should be included in the determination
of his retirement benefits.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter was heard before the Utah State Retirement
Board, and is appealed directly to this Court, from that Board.

DISPOSITION OF AGENCY ACTION
The Utah State Retirement Board ruled that the Petitioner'
Overtime, would not be allowed beyond the ten per cent restriction
in 49-3-103(7)(a) plus the cost of living adjustment of
three percent, for a total of thirteen percent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioner terminated his employment with

the Utah Department of Transportation on July 30, 1994.
Record at Page 109.
2.

Petitioner set his retirement dates as of

August 1, 1994 and was eligible for retirement benefits
from the Utah Retirement System as of that date.
Record at Page 109.
3.

In September, 1993, Petitioner received a

promotion and his base salary was increased from
fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to
sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56) per hour.
Record at Page 110.
4.

Petitioner received no overtime pay between

early 1991 and July, 1993.
5.

Record at Page 110.

Associated with the promotion, Petitioner

was required to put in substantial overtime, about one
year before his termination of employment.

Record at

Page 110.
6.

That on or about January 5, 1990, the Utah

Department of Transportation established a State wide
policy on OVERTIME WORK.
7.

Record at Page 88.

In the said Policy Declaration, the State

adopted the following practice:
!f

#l. Overtime work shall be kept to an absolute
minimum consistent with the operating needs of the
department.fl
"#4. Any authorized time worked in excess of
8 hours in any one day and for work and paid leave time
in excess of 40 hours in a week shall be classed as
overtime (except for special cases as quoted in #2 above).
It will be the Practice of the Department to assure
workers of eight hours of work for each regular day.
Supervisors will be responsible to send an employee
home after 8 hours if an emergency situation does not
exist."
"#5. Overtime compensation is established for
each class title and is identified in the Class Code Book
as N (Fair Labor Standard Act, FLSA, non-exempt), or
E (Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA, exempt)."
"#6. A minimum of 40 hours per week with no
maximum is prescribed for maintenance supervisors, and
all Department positions grades 27 and above."
"#7. The department will compensate those in
grades 27 and 28 for justified overtime worked in excess
of 50 hours in one week at the employees regular
compensation rate."
"#10. Supervisors will assure that employees
will not be called to work on holidays for overtime work
except in critical situations."
"#11. Prior approval of all requests for overtime
payment must be cleared in writing for overtime that
is clearly of an emergency nature when it is not feasible
to obtain approval."
"#13. By administrative action, exceptions
to the general policy on overtime may be approved under
special and justifiable circumstances."
"#14. When overtime is worked, consideration
must be given so that the duration of consecutive
work will nor impair the employeefs ability to perform
safely." Record at Page 88.

8.

On or about April 11, 1995, Dana A. Meier,

the District Engineer, issued the following letter:
April 11, 1995
To Whom it May Concern:
In the spring of 1993, Mr. Ron Allred applied
for and was the successful applicant for the Station
Supervisor of Station 245 of the Utah Department of
Transportation. In July of 1993, Mr. Allred began his
assignment for the above noted position.
During that time, station 245 was responsible
for landscape throughout the district, for all the
graffiti removal, and for the roving machanics.
The landscape responsibilities included part
of the multimillion dollar landscape project recently
and for the week control and chemical spraying on the
state right of ways.
Mr. Allred was responsible to assure that all
graffiti was removed from the State right of ways
within 24 hours. His office was the graffiti "hot
line" where all requests for graffiti removal were
taken and then prioritized for removal.
Because of Mr. Allred!s previous experience as
a roving mechanic, he was assigned to supervise the
roving mechanics in the District.
These duties and all the other duties assigned
to Mr. Allred during this period of time required that
he work many hours of overtime. Mr. Allred followed
the Department procedures of having his overtime
approved. He did not work any more hours than what
was required of him.
As the maintenance Engineer for District Two,
I was very appreciative of the great amount of work
that Mr. Allred accomplished, as he truly was an asset
to the Department of Transportation.

Record at Page 88.
9.

Sincerely,
Dana A. Meier, P.E.
District Engineer

On or about April 10, 1995, Verl k. Ahlstrom,

the Region Two Maintenance Area Supervisor, issued

the following letter:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCER:
While working under my direction, Ronald H.
Allred was in charge of all Region Two graffiti
removal, mechanical repair to all vehicles,
landscaping and sprikler systems. He was also
on-call for snow removal. During this time,
he was required to work overtime to accomplish
the many demands of his position. At no time
does anyone in Region Two work overtime without
justification. In every case of overtime usage,
written justification was and is required.

Record at Page 90.
10.

Verl K. Ahlstrom
Region Two Maintenance Area
Supervisor

According to the Human Resource Profile,

Ronald H. Allred was paid a wage retroactively for
six weeks going backwards from the date in which he was
promoted.
11.

Record at Page 90.
Ronald H. Allred1s only overtime stemmed

from his promotion to Station Supervisor of Station 245
of the Utah Department of Transportation.

Record at

Page 91.
12.

The Respondent applied a ten (10) percent

limitation of the Petitioner's Overtime.
Page 110.

Record at

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves a single question of law, regarding
the Final Average Salary of the Appellant, for purposes of
determining his retirement pay.
The sole question is whether the Utah State Retirement
Board will include the whole amount of overtime in the computation
or a mere thirteen (13) per cent of the same.
Appellant was promoted the year before he retired, and in
the subject promotion, Appellant was required to put in
substantial amounts of overtime.
The Utah State Retirement Board only allowed the said thirteen per cent of the same, because they must be "kctuarily" "sound11,
and to allow the overtime, would increase the benefits to the
Retiree.
Appellant submits that being sound actuarily is nice, and
even preferred, but that criteria can not be a pretext for disallowing the Retiree what he has earned, and what has vested in the
Retiree through a lifetime of contributions to the system.
The very nature of the terms, " . . . the highest three years
of annual compensation preceding retirement . . . " suggests that the
Utah State Retirement Board, should allow the overtime to be considere
Moreover, when this Court reviews the provision in the
Code defining "compensation" as being " . . . the total amount of
payments made by an employer to an employee for services rendered
to the employer. . ." there should be no question that "overtime"
pay must be included in the said computation, as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT ONE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ALL OF HIS
OVERTIME CONSIDERED AS PART OF HIS FINAL AVERAGE
SALARY.
Petitioner submits that the center of the
problem stems from the Respondents refusal to acknowledge the fact that Petitioner had a promotion, and
that as a direct and proximate result of the said
promotion, he had to complete additional hours of
overtime, which was beyond his control.
As a result, this Court must decide whether
the State Retirement Board has to follow what the State
Legislature determined, or do they follow what they
called at the hearing, "sound business practices.11
The controlling provisions of the Utah Code
Annotated, are found at 49-3-103, under the provisions
entitled "Definitions."
In subsection (7) are the specific provisions
that are controlling here:
(7)

"Final Average Salary" Means the amount

computed by averaging the highest three years of
annual compensation preceding retirement subject to
to Subsections (a), (b), and (c).
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b),

the percentage increase in annual
compensation in any one of the years
used may not exceed the previous year's
salary by more than 10% plus a cost-ofliving adjustment equal to the decrease
in the purchasing power of the dollar
during the previous year, as measured
by the Consumer Price Index prepared by
the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
(b) In cakes where the employing unit
provides acceptable documentation to
the board, the limitation in Subsection
(a) may be exceeded if:
(i) the member has transferred
from another employing unit;
(ii) the member has been promoted
to a new position; or
(iii) the years used are not
consecutive.
(c) For purposes of computing the member's
final average salary only, the member is
considered to have been in service at
his last salary rate from the date of
termination of employment to the date
retirement becomes effective if the
member so requests.
In this matter, the Petitioner, requests that
Subsection (c) applies, and that he elects to have "his
last salary rate from the date of termination of employment to the date retirement becomes effective." to
be the criteria of the measurement of "Final Average
Salary."
Hence, instead of the Board having to determine
the "highest three years of annual compensation

preceding retirement"

the Petitioner requests that

retirement be based on Mhis last salary rate from
the date of termination of employment to the date
retirement becomes effective."
This would be the preferred determination
by the Petitioner.
However, should this Court find that this
would be inappropriate, then the Petition's fall back
position would be the provisions of 49-3-103(7)(b)(ii).
Under this analysis, the Petitioner qualifies
as an exception to subsection (a) because the Petitioner
was promoted to a new position.

It is undisputed that

the Petitioner was promoted, and he took employment
in Salt Lake County, which required massive overtime
beyond his control, from his prior employment in
Sevier County.
As a result, the limitation placed on an
employee under subsection (a) would not apply, as
subsection (a) states:
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b),
the percentage increase in annual compensation
in any one of the years used may not exceed
the previous year's salary by more than 107o
plus cost-of-living adjustment . . . .
Whether this Court decides that either 49-3-103

(7) (c) applies or if 49-3-103(b)(ii) applies, it still
must be determined if overtime should or should not
be included.
The State Legislature used the term "annual
compensation11, and the State Retirement Board says
that does not include "overtime" as it would not be
"sound business practices" to allow those figures to
be included.
Petitioner submits that "annual compensation"
is exactly what the State Legislature stated and that
is what one was paid over the course of one year.
The Respondent can control this figure in
various ways:
(1) They can petition the State Legislature,
just like anyone else to get a clarification, except
these folks should have sufficient clout to get the
legislature^ attention, as the funding for this
program would come from the same.
In this case, the clarification must be sought
before the Petitioner's retirement has vested, and
not be an attempt to change the state of the law,
retroactively.
(2)

They can draw the attention of these

provisions to those of the State Employment administrators, so as to be careful not to allow "overtime11
during the last three jrears of employment.
This attempt may not be realistic, because of
the nature of "overtime."

This is Petitioner's Point

exactly.
The "overtime" is all the more compensation
for going beyond the

call of duty.

Here the overtime stemmed from the Petitioner
responding to the call to assist

in the management,

where he had in times past been in the rank and file.
The notions of management contemplates the
best minds, and the best efforts, etc. over extended
time, giving rise to controlling the efforts of those
being lead.
Surely the State Legislature intended those
who had been promoted to reap the benefits of their
life time efforts, and that is why they specifically
excepted them out of the provisions of Subsection
(a) in the Code.
In this case no one argues with the numbers,
or how much was earned and when.
In this case the whole controversy centers

around the question of does "compensation" include
"overtime.f!
Petitioner submits that it is not a matter
of "sound business practices" whether he gets paid
what he earned.
Surely, the State Retirement Board must be
practical and sound in the administration of the
retirement funds for the Utah State Employees, but
the notion of "sound business practices" can never
be allowed as a pretense from paying out what has been
in fact earned by the employee.

ARGUMENT TWO
THE CLAIM THAT RONALD ALLRED SPIKED HIS TIME
IN ORDER TO INCREASE HIS RETIREMENT PACKAGE IS WITHOUT MERIT.
As noted in the record beginning at page 48,
the Respondent argues that the Petitioner spiked
his time to make a last years run, just to increase
his average for purposes of increasing his MFinal
Average Salary.11
As noted in the record at pages 101 to 106,
this claim is wholly without merit.
Respondent makes a big deal about the fact
that Mr. Allred was present at the hearing in this
matter,and that he should have testified regarding
spiking.
Petitioner submits that this is a bit alarming,
as it is the Respondent making the claim of spiking,
and therefore it is the Respondent that carries the
burden of proof, and Respondent failed in its burden
of proof to show any evidence whatsoever of any spiking.

ARGUMENT THREE
RESPONDENT SUGGEST THAT THIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE MUST LOOK AT THE WHOLE OF THE LAW ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, YET ATTEMPT TO HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE ONLY CONSIDER PART OF THE PUBLISHED LAW REGARDING
THE LAW GOVERNING OVERTIME PAY.
As noted in the Respondent Memorandum, they
suggest that the Administrative Law Judge must look
at the whole of 49-3-103(7) to get a full and fair
reading of the law.
However, they wholly failed to bring to the
Administrative law Judge attention the Rules and
Regulations regarding OVERTIME WORK, governing the
Department of Transportation.
Petitioner agrees that the Court must look
at the whole of the subject statute to make sense of
the same, and by the same token, this Court must 16ok
at all of the law regarding the compensation program
promulgated by the state of Utah, to fairly determine
the issues before this Court.
As a result, the Claim by the Respondent that
there was an effort on the part of the Petitioner to
increase his last years pay by spiking is wholly
without merit.
Petitioner is governed by the OVERTIME WORK,

published Policy, and could not deviate from the same,
even if he wanted to.
There is no evidence that he in fact deviated
from the established rules, and yet the statement by
Verl K. Ahlstrom, Region Two Maintenance Area Supervisor
is squarely on point;
11

. . . At no time does anyone in Region Two
work overtime without justification. In every case
of overtime usage, written justification was and is
required/1
Hence, Petitioner submits that any claim by the
Respondent that somehow he unfairly increased his
time during the last year, is not well taken.

ARGUMENT FOUR
PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE STATE OF UTAH CAN FAIRLY
AND PROSPECTIFY ADDRESS THE OVERTIME QUESTION IF IT
CHOOSES, AND IF THE STATE DOES NOT SO REMEDY THE
PROBLEM IN ADVANCE THE COURT CAN NOT DO THE SAME
AFTER THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HAVE VESTED.
Petitioner submits that what is abundantly
clear in this matter, is that the State of Utah, can
establish whatever they want in defining

ff

Final Average

Salary.11
The fact that they define it in a certain fashion,
should not result in cases such as the one at bar,
on wholly subjective criteria, called by the Respondent,
"actuarially sound basis."
To define one's vested retirement as you get
what we say i^ "actually sound" is like no definition
at all, and makes the whole program wholly arbitrary
and capricious.
The matter before this Court is a determination
of the retirement program that is vested.
Many years of deductions are taken from the
Retiree's paycheck, and he plans literally the balance
of his life, based upon what should be absolutey clear
and unequivocal, published criteria.
Now, after all of the years that the Petitioner's

rights have been significantly impacted, the Responent
suggests, "Well, you get what we say is actuarially
sound."
One could literally end up with nothing, after
decades of contributions, on the subjective call,
that they get what is actuarially sound.
What this Court must consider is the fact that
in reality, the State of Utah, did not say you get what
is actuarially sound, rather you get your retirement
based on clearly established criteria, which in this
case expressly includes the overtime efforts of the
Petitioner in the "Final Average Salary."
Hence, Petitioner, as a matter of law is
entitled to the inclusion of all of his overtime in
determining his "Final Average Salary."

ARGUMENT FIVE
THE STATE LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY INCLUDED ALL OF ONES
OVERTIME IN THE DETERMINATION OF FINAL AVERAGE SALARY
In 49-3-103 of the Utah Code Annotated, the
State Legislature stated the following:
"Final average salaryM means the amount computed
by averaging the highest three years of annual
compensated preceding retirement subject
to Subsections (a),(b) and (c) .
Then in 49-3-103(2) the State Legislature
defines compensation:
(2) (a) "Compensation,11 "salary,11 or "wages"
means the total amount of payments made by
an employer to an employee for services
rendered to the employer, including:
(i) bonuses;
(ii) cost-of-living adjustments;
(iii) amounts that the employee
authorizes to be deducted or reduced for salary
deferral or other benefit programs authorized
by federal law.
(b) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter
may not exceed the amount allowed under
Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a)(17).
(c) "Compensation," "salary," or "wages" does
not include:
(i) the monetary value of renumeration
paid in kind, such as a residence or use of
equipment;
(ii) all contributions made by an
employer under any plan for the benefit of a
participant;
(iii) salary paid to an employee working
under the minimum number of hours required for
membership;
(iv) salary paid to a temporary or
exempt employee;
(v) an> payment upon termination,
including accumulated lump-sum vacation,
sick leave payments, or any other special

payments; or
(vi) uniform, travel, or similar
allowances.
It is absolutely clear that if the State
Legislature only was going to allow 10% increase in
wage, plus cost of living increase, then they clearly
could have put the same in the definition of compensation,
as they not only defined what it was, but defined
what it was not.
Yet, no where in any of the Statutes referred
to by the Respondent do they point out any basis
for the claim that the State of Utkh only allows 13%
increase over the year before.
The State Legislature stated that compensation
"means the total amount of payments made by an employer
to an employee for services rendered to the employer."
Petitioner respectfully submits that he is
entitled to have the whole of his overtime considered
in the "Final Average Salary" and not just some totally
fabricated limit of 13%.

ARGUMENT SIX
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT OVERTIME MUST BE LIMITED TO 13
PERCENT VIOLATES ALL OF THEIR STATED RULES REGARDING
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
It is true that 49-3-103(7)(a) provides for a
ten percent limitation, coupled with a cost of living
adjustment, however, that is only the case, ,fEXCEPT AS
PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (B).ff
Subsection (b)(ii) provides that there is
absolutely no such limitation of increases, where
the same is on the basis, that:
f,

The member has been promoted to a new

position."
Therefore subpart (a) has absolutely no
application to this matter whatsoever.
The statute does not say, well if the member
has been promoted, then we will only consider up
to 13 per cent of his overtime.
That is found no where in the Statute, has
no basis in the law whatsoever, and is only found
in the Memorandum of the Respondent, under some pretext,
"actuarially sound."
Rather the Code explicitly states that
compensation "means the total amount of payments made

by an employer to an employee for services rendered
to the employer."
Just as Respondent argues that the whole
statute must be considered, to make the sense of the
program,they too must be governed by the whole of the
statute, and the whole of the statute most clearly
says the total amount of payments, which no mention
whatsoever of only 13 per cent of overtime.
To adopt the reasoning of the Respondent, one
has to say, well compensation means one thing under
subpart (a), but means something totally different
under subpart (b).
Such is not the case, the Court must consider
the statute as a whole, and can not overlook the
clear and unequivocal expression by the State Legislature
that compensation, "means the total amount>of payments
made by an employer to an employee for services
rendered to the employer.11
Petitioner is absolutely entitled to have
his entire overtime pay considered in the determination
of his "final average salary."

ARGUMENT SEVEN
THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF BEING "ACTUARIALLY SOUND" IS
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BEING "ACTUARIALLY UNSOUND"
Perhaps the best evidence of the Respondents
position in this matter is found on page 33 of the
transcript, wherein Mr. Anderson is asking the questions,
and Ms. Archibald is testifying under oath:
Q. Okay. What is your understanding of the
purpose of the ten-percent limitation in the
statute?
A. We're required to operate on an actuary
sound basis. If individuals through their
career are not working any overtime, the actuary
is determined for future benefits on salary.
If we allow people to increase their salaries
considerably in those final three years, then
we become actuarially unsound.
Q. So the object is to protect the financial
basis of the system, number one; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And to have monthly retirement benefit
that pretty much reflects that earning history
of the member; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Petitioner submits that this claim is absolutely
absurd, because a fair reading of the statute expressly
states that you take the "highest three years of
annual compensation.ff
To suggest to this tiourt that we must be

"actuarially sound" and any consideration of "overtime
beyond a mere 13 percent consideration" flies in the
face of the most clear and unequivocal language found
in the statute, and that is the "highest three years
of annual compensation."
Petitioner respectfully submits that it is
"actually unsound" to argue that we can not consider
all of one's overtime, because if we do, then we
will be considering all of the "total payments made
by an employer to an employee for

services rendered

to the employer."
When this is exactly what the State Legislature
mandated that the Respondent do.
Hence, Petitioner is entitled to have all of
his overtime considered as compensation, in the
determination of his "Final Average Salary."

ARGUMENT EIGHT
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT REGARDING BEING "ACTUARY SOUND"
ARE BETTER RESOLVED WITH THE STATE LEGISLATURE, THAN
AN INAPPROPRIATE READING OF THE UTAH CODE BY THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
It is obvious that everyone would want the
Utah State Retirement Board to administer the retirement
programs in a sound and reasonable fashion.
However, that does not mean that the Retirees
should get whatever the Board says is sound.
Rather, it should mean that if there is a
problem with the definition of ftFinal Average Salary,"
then the State Legislature should define it some
other way than !tthe total amount of payments made
by an employer to an employee for services rendered
to the employer."
If the Utah State Retirement Board, does not
want to include overtime compensation in the determination of "Final Average, Salary" then the definition of
the same should read, "the total amount of payments
made by any employer to an employee for services
rendered to the employer not including overtime
compensation."
This is ever so easy for the State Legislature
to do, and is clearly not something for the Court to

read into the Statute.
Everyone, especially the Petitioner, is big
on being "actuary sound1'1 as his lifetime of withholding
is based upon the retirement being there when he
needs it.
However, the Court can not change the rules
after the rights have vested.
Hence, the real remedy here, if there is a
problem with the program

being sound, is with the

State Legislature, applying the rules across the
board and prospectively, and not the Court's
retroactively carving out an exception for one
individual, after his rights have vested.,

CONCLUSION
This Court is deciding vested rights that
have accrued over the Course of three decades, paid
for by the Petitioner consistently and religiously,
every single paycheck, every single month, during
every single year.
Respondent would have this Court believe that
they can pay whatever they want just so it is
"actuarially sound.11
Petitioner submits that if overtime should be
excluded, then the Utah Code could be readily changed
to so reflect, but it clearly incliides overtime;
and it is a mere pretext, for what is clearly an
arbitrary and capricious subjective call, to say, "Well
we will only pay what we say is "actuarially sound11
and nothing more.ff
Petitioner is entitled to the benefits that
he has earned and respectfully requests that all his
overtime be considered compensation as

outlined in the

Statute.
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Board's determination, and remand with instructions
to include all of the Petitioner's overtime for purposes of
determining his "final average salary."

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of September, 1995.

JOHN/WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
to the Appellee, by mailing the same in the United States Mails,
addressed to DANIEL D. ANDERSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 560 EAST 200
SOUTH, SUITE 230, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84102, this 20th day of
September, 1995.

ADDENDUM

KEVIN A. HOWARD [4343]
DANIEL D. ANDERSEN [5907]
Attorney's for Respondent
Utah State Retirement Board
560 East 200 South, Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 366-7471

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

RONALD ALLRED,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent,

Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal
memoranda submitted by both parties, the adjudicative hearing officer marks the following Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner terminated his employment with the Utah Department of Transportation

on July 30,1994.
2.

Petitioner set his retirement date as of August 1,1994 and was eligible for

retirement benefits from the Utah State Retirement System as of that date.
3.

In September, 1993, Petitioner received a promotion and his base salary was

|Dan\AUrad2.mtn]
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increased fromfifteendollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour to sixteen dollars andfiftysix cents
($16.56) per hour.
4.

Petitioner received no overtime pay between early 1991 and July, 1993.

5.

In July, 1993, three months prior to his promotion, and one year prior to his

termination of employment, Petitioner began receiving substantial overtime pay.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The ten percent (10%) limitation of increase in compensation for purposes of

computing a final average salary found in Utah Code Ann. §49-3-103(7) is not applicable to
Petitioner's September, 1993 increase in pay from fifteen dollars and seven cents ($15.07) per hour
to sixteen dollars and fifty six cents ($16.56) per hour.
2.

The ten percent (10%) limitation of increase in compensation for purposes of

computing a final average salary referred to in Conclusion of Laws #1 is applicable to Petitioner's
substantial overtime pay that he began to receive in July, 1993.
3.

Petitioner was entitled to a three percent (3%) cost of living adjustment and his final

average salary computation.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Petitioner's request for board action is denied; and

/?

DATED this * I day

of 1995

^

' (1

JS? J

/ ^ / J a m e s L. Barker, Jr.
Adjucative Hearing Officer

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
DATED this

j-fa

day of

Jfrflg

, 199 £"

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
SUITE 270, 2319 FOOTHILL DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84109
Telephone: 467-9700

BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
------—0000O0000--——

DONALD ALLRED,
Petitioner,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
and
PETITION FOR REVIEW

vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent.
--------------0000O0000

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Petitioner, Donald
Allred, does hereby appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, all of
the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER OF DISMISSAL
to the Utah Court of Appeals, which was entered by the Utah
State Retirement Board on or about June 8, 1995.
This appeal-is made pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and in accordance with the Utah Code Annotated 63-46fe-16
as amended in 1988.
Dated this 7th day of July, 1995.

JOHJT WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL and PETITION FOR
REVIEW, to the Respondent, by mailing the same in the United States
Mails, addressed to DANIEL D. ANDERSON, UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
BOARD, 560 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 230, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84102,
this 7th dav of Julv. 1995.
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